The following is an article published in Volume 10, Issue 4 of Law & Technology, Seoul National University.

Author: Jae kwon Jung

I. Introduction

Korea has enacted the Framework Act on Science and Technology and its subordinate regulation, the Regulation on the Management, etc. of National Research and Development Projects (hereinafter, the “National R&D Regulation”), under which the government provides research funding to conduct national R&D projects in areas such as basic science and other fields that are difficult for the private sector to undertake independently. To date, numerous laws and institutional measures have been implemented to ensure that the results of national R&D projects are transferred, commercialized, and disseminated throughout society. However, the definitions of key concepts relating to technology transfer and dissemination have not been consistent, and there are conflicts both within individual statutes and regulations and among different laws and regulations governing similar matters. As a result, some provisions have, contrary to the original purpose of the relevant legislation, inadvertently operated not as mechanisms for promoting technology transfer and commercialization but rather as regulatory constraints on them.

This article examines these inconsistencies in conceptual definitions and the provisions of laws and regulations that operate as constraints on the social dissemination of intangible research results. It also discusses the need for international protection of rights and policies promoting international commercialization that take into account the particular characteristics of intellectual property rights.

Meanwhile, on August 12, 2014, the Korean Government amended the National R&D Regulation in part to reorganize the ownership system for R&D results and improve the technology royalty system. This article examines those amendments as well. It also addresses areas that remain difficult to apply or interpret even after the amendments, as well as the contents and problems of subordinate regulations that are still being revised in connection with the amendments.

II. Examination of Problems in the Current Legal Framework

1. Overview of Korean Laws and Regulations Concerning Technology Transfer and Commercialization

The Korean laws and regulations relating to the transfer and commercialization of the results of national R&D projects include the Patent Act, which establishes the basic principles and general rules concerning patents; the Framework Act on Science and Technology, which provides the foundation for national science and technology policy and the implementation of national R&D projects; the subordinate National R&D Regulation; ministerial directives and administrative rules issued by individual government ministries; and the Act on the Promotion of Technology Transfer and Commercialization, which was enacted following the enactment and subsequent comprehensive revision of the former Technology Transfer Promotion Act for the purpose of promoting technology transfer and commercialization.

Other relevant legislation includes the Industrial Technology Innovation Promotion Act, the Special Act on the Development of Research and Development Special Zones, including Daedeok Innopolis, the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses, the Support for Small and Medium Enterprise Establishment Act, the Invention Promotion Act, and the Industrial Development Act.

Among these statutes and regulations, this article primarily examines the Patent Act, which governs the patent system; the Framework Act on Science and Technology, which contains the basic policies concerning technology transfer and commercialization in national R&D projects; the Act on the Promotion of Technology Transfer and Commercialization; and the National R&D Regulation.

2. Inadequate Definitions and Inconsistencies among Laws and Regulations

Among the principal terms relating to technology transfer and commercialization whose definitions are unclear or inconsistent across the current legal framework are “practice,” corresponding in the Anglo-American legal system to the concept of “licensing,” “technology transfer,” “commercialization,” which appears in conjunction with technology transfer in most cases, and “technology royalties,” which appear to arise from some or all of the foregoing concepts.

As discussed below, these problems in conceptual definitions appear to have arisen in part from the translation of foreign laws and regulations and from the process of enacting and amending new legislation.

With respect to the principles governing the application and interpretation of laws and regulations, higher-ranking legislation should generally take precedence, in the order of statutes, Presidential Decrees, Ministerial Ordinances, and administrative rules. Among statutes of equal rank, a special statute should generally take precedence over a general statute. Where provisions governing priority among laws of equal rank exist, those provisions should be followed.

The Act on the Promotion of Technology Transfer and Commercialization (hereinafter, the “Technology Transfer Act”) provides in Article 4(1), concerning its relationship with other laws, that the Act shall apply unless otherwise provided by another law with respect to technology transfer and commercialization. Accordingly, where similar concepts are defined in other laws, such as the Patent Act and the Framework Act on Science and Technology, those definitions would take precedence.

Nevertheless, examining the definitions of similar concepts in the Patent Act, other relevant statutes, and the Technology Transfer Act remains meaningful because uniformity in the definitions of concepts across laws is necessary to prevent confusion; because laws other than the Technology Transfer Act do not define the concept of “commercialization”; and because undefined or ambiguous concepts should be interpreted by reference to other relevant laws.

This article therefore focuses, among these issues of conceptual definition, on concepts relating to patents, which lie at the center of technology transfer and commercialization.

A. “Practice”

Japan enacted its Patent Act on April 13, 1953, and subsequently defined such terms as “invention,” “patented invention,” and “practice” through various amendments. The term “practice” appears to have been introduced in translating the Anglo-American concept of “licensing” into Chinese characters. Under the Japanese Patent Act, “practice” is defined as follows:

“1. In the case of an invention of a product (including a program, etc.; the same shall apply hereinafter), acts of producing, using, assigning, etc. (meaning assignment and lending, and, in the case of a product that is a program, etc., including providing through a telecommunications network; the same shall apply hereinafter), exporting or importing the product, or making an offer for assignment, etc. (including displaying the product for the purpose of assignment, etc.; the same shall apply hereinafter);

  1. In the case of an invention of a process, acts of using the process; and
  2. In the case of an invention of a process for producing a product, in addition to the acts under the preceding item, acts of using, assigning, etc., exporting or importing a product produced by that process, or making an offer for assignment, etc. of such product.”

Based on this definition, the concept of “practice” under Japanese patent law does not appear to correspond completely to the concept of “licensing.” In other words, while it does not encompass the entirety of the concepts of technology transfer or technology transfer agreements, it appears to include, at least in part, the concept of “practicing,” namely, the utilization of technology or the production of products using such technology.

China’s Patent Law was enacted following its adoption at the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on March 12, 1984, and was subsequently amended for the third time pursuant to the decision of the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress on December 27, 2008.

The Chinese Patent Law as amended on December 27, 2008, defined concepts such as “invention” and “utility model,” but did not separately define “practice.” Article 11 of the statute, however, provides that, after patent rights have been granted for an invention or utility model, no entity or individual may, without obtaining permission from the patent owner, practice the patent, and, for production or business purposes, may not manufacture, use, offer for sale, sell, or import the patented product, or use the patented process, or use, offer for sale, sell, or import products directly obtained through the patented process, except as otherwise provided by law.

In other words, while the provision prohibits the practice of a patent without the patent owner's authorization, it simultaneously prohibits, for production or business purposes, the manufacture, use, offering for sale, sale, or importation of the patented product, as well as the use of the patented process and the use, offering for sale, sale, or importation of products directly obtained through that process.

This provision may first be understood as elaborating upon the concept of “practice.” Second, it distinguishes between patented products and patented processes: in the case of a patented product, the concept of practice encompasses acts relating to the product itself, while in the case of a patented process, it encompasses the use of the process and the manufacture, use, offering for sale, sale, or importation of products obtained through the use of the patented process.

Under this interpretation, as in Japanese patent law, Chinese patent law distinguishes between inventions of products and inventions of processes. In the case of products, the acts of use, offering for sale, sale, and importation correspond to the Japanese Patent Act's definition of practice, which includes production, use, assignment, etc., importation, exportation, and offers for assignment, etc. In the case of process inventions, the use of the patented process and the use, offering for sale, sale, or importation of products obtained through that process are similarly treated as acts constituting practice.

The Korean Patent Act, enacted and promulgated on April 13, 1952, began defining the term “practice” when it was comprehensively amended on January 13, 1990. Since there is little substantive difference between the definition at that time and the current definition, Article 2(3) of the current Patent Act provides:

“3. The term ‘practice’ means any of the following acts:

(a) In the case of an invention of a product, producing, using, assigning, leasing, or importing the product, or making an offer to assign or lease the product (including displaying the product for the purpose of assignment or lease; the same shall apply hereinafter);

(b) In the case of an invention of a process, using the process; and

(c) In the case of an invention of a process for producing a product, in addition to the acts under item (b), using, assigning, leasing, or importing a product produced by the process, or making an offer to assign or lease such product.”

Thus, the Korean Patent Act appears to have adopted, almost verbatim, the conceptual approach of the Japanese Patent Act in defining “practice” as a term corresponding to “licensing.” Accordingly, just as the concept of “practice” under Japanese patent law does not completely correspond to the Anglo-American concept of licensing, the same necessarily applies to the Korean Patent Act.

From this perspective, there is a need to define the term “technology transfer,” which is not defined in the Korean Patent Act. Korean law addresses this issue in the Technology Transfer Act, which defines the concept of “technology transfer.” This definition will be examined below.

The Framework Act on Science and Technology, which establishes the basic policies governing the operation of national R&D projects in Korea, defines “practice” as “using, assigning, leasing, or exporting R&D outcomes.” Its subordinate Presidential Decree, the National R&D Regulation, provides in Article 2(7) that “use” includes cases in which R&D results are used for production and that “assignment” includes technology transfer, thereby providing greater specificity to the concepts of use and assignment.

The Framework Act on Science and Technology defines “practice” as intending to use, assign, lease, or export R&D outcomes, whereas the National R&D Regulation defines it as actually using, assigning, leasing, or exporting them. Accordingly, there is a difference in meaning between the Framework Act, which may be interpreted as encompassing acts undertaken in the process of intending to engage in such conduct, and the National R&D Regulation, which may be interpreted as referring only to the acts themselves.

Furthermore, the Framework Act on Science and Technology and the National R&D Regulation define “practice” differently from the Patent Act, which contains the fundamental principles governing Korea’s patent system, thereby creating potential confusion in the application and interpretation of the laws.

As discussed above, the Korean Patent Act distinguishes among inventions of products, inventions of processes, and inventions of processes for producing products in defining “practice.” In contrast to the Framework Act on Science and Technology and the National R&D Regulation, under which the objects of acts such as use, assignment, leasing, and export are “R&D outcomes” or “R&D results,” the Patent Act defines these acts differently depending on the type of invention.

In the case of an invention of a product, the object of use, assignment, leasing, importation, and an offer for assignment or lease is the product itself. In the case of an invention of a process, the object of use is the process itself. In the case of an invention of a process for producing a product, the object of use is the process itself, while the object of use, assignment, leasing, importation, or an offer for assignment or lease is the product produced by that process.

Accordingly, the objects of the acts constituting “practice” differ substantially between the Patent Act, on the one hand, and the Framework Act on Science and Technology and the National R&D Regulation, on the other. It is therefore difficult to regard the scope of the concept of “practice” as being identical under these laws and regulations.

The National R&D Regulation does not separately define “R&D results,” but Article 20 distinguishes between tangible and intangible R&D results. This raises the question of whether, under the Patent Act, a product produced by a patented process should be regarded as a tangible R&D result—in other words, whether a tangible product derived from an intangible result should be regarded as a tangible result of a national R&D project. Consequently, there is considerable room for debate as to whether the use, assignment, leasing, or export of such a product constitutes “practice” subject to the Framework Act on Science and Technology and the National R&D Regulation.

Furthermore, the National R&D Regulation defines “use” to include cases in which an R&D result is used to produce a product. In the case of an intangible result, “use” could reasonably be understood, in the context of a process invention, to mean using the invention to produce a product, whereas in other cases it would more naturally refer to the use of the product itself. Thus, the term “use” may have different meanings depending on whether it refers to an intangible result such as an invention or a tangible result such as a product, potentially creating further interpretive confusion.

Finally, under the Patent Act, “assignment, leasing, importation, or an offer for assignment or lease of a product” is limited to products. By contrast, under the Framework Act on Science and Technology and the National R&D Regulation, such acts are defined with respect to R&D outcomes or R&D results generally. Consequently, the meaning of “assignment,” “leasing,” and “export” in relation to intangible results, including intellectual property rights such as patents, remains unclear.

Although assignment of patent rights and other intellectual property rights is a recognized concept under the patent system, there is no clear statutory definition of the concepts of “leasing” or “exporting” patent rights or other intellectual property rights. This may give rise to further confusion.

Accordingly, these concepts should either be specifically redefined, or the ambiguous expression “intending to use, assign, lease, or export R&D outcomes” should be revised and clarified.

B. Technology Transfer

Before examining the statutory definition of “technology transfer” under Korean law, it is useful to consider the academic and practical definitions of the term, as summarized below.

Source Definition

UNCTAD (1971)

International technology transfer occurs when technological knowledge elements normally required for the design or process management of new production facilities or the expansion of existing facilities are transferred between developed and developing countries.

Forster (1971)

Technology transfer is classified, from the perspective of its direction, into horizontal transfer—between projects, organizations, industries, or countries—and vertical transfer—from basic research through applied research, development, and commercialization.

Gee (1974)

The application of technology for a new use or by a new technology user, including not only direct application but also modification to accommodate new uses or users.

Teece (1988)

A series of stages through which knowledge is transformed into new products and services.

Souder (1990)

The process by which technology owned by one party is transferred so that it is adopted by another party; that is, movement from a developer to a provider or user, or from one department to another.

Bozeman & Crow (1991)

The process by which physical designs, processes, know-how, and information move from one organization or location to another.

Camp & Sexton (1992)

The transfer of technological knowledge, the delivery of research results to potential users, and the movement of technological ideas or know-how from the organization that first identified them during development to a user organization.

Zhao & Reddy (1993)

The process of exchanging firm-specific technological know-how between a provider and an adopter.

Seaton & Hayes (1993)

The process of promoting technological innovation through the transfer of ideas, knowledge, and products from academic R&D to effective general application.

Brooks (1996)

The process by which science and technology diffuse through human activity, broadly defining the actors involved in technology transfer to include states, corporations, and individuals.

Abert (1997)

The process by which an invention is transferred from one organization or individual to another for purposes of commercialization under a licensing agreement.

Lee Jeong-won (2002)

The process by which technology, knowledge, techniques, tools, or means move from where they were created to another place for use in production or service activities.

Lane (2003)

The movement of technology from one domain to another.

Ahn Seong-jo (2003)

The transfer of impractical scientific knowledge to a company or business sector requiring the technology for purposes of commercialization or practical application.

Daghfous (2004)

Interaction at the corporate level undertaken for the purpose of learning and acquiring competitive advantage.

According to these conceptual definitions (hereinafter, the “theoretical definition”), “technology transfer” ultimately refers to the transfer of technology from one domain to another through various means, including technology sales and licensing. Under this definition, the term “technology transfer” appears to have a more abstract and broader scope than the statutory concept of “practice” discussed above.

Consistent with this understanding, technology transfer has also been defined broadly as a process whereby technology generated as a result of R&D investment can become a means of generating new revenue through spin-offs, technology sales, licensing, and other mechanisms without necessarily undergoing the traditional process of technology development and commercialization. In this sense, the concept of technology transfer encompasses spin-offs, technology sales, and licensing.

Under Korean law, the Technology Transfer Act, which establishes the basic policies for promoting technology transfer and commercialization, defines “technology transfer” in Article 2(2) as follows:

“Technology transfer” means the transfer of technology from a technology holder (including a person authorized to dispose of the relevant technology) to another person by means such as assignment, grant of a license, technical guidance, joint research, joint venture, or merger or acquisition.

This definition appears to correspond to the theoretical definition of technology transfer.

Under this definition, “assignment” in the Technology Transfer Act should be understood as referring to a transfer of ownership, and “assignment” should therefore be regarded as a subordinate concept within the broader concept of “technology transfer.”

The National R&D Regulation, however, provides in defining “assignment” that assignment includes the concept of “technology transfer,” without defining what “technology transfer” means in that context.

Ultimately, the meaning of “technology transfer” under the Technology Transfer Act differs from its meaning under the National R&D Regulation. The Technology Transfer Act treats “technology transfer” as a broader concept encompassing “assignment,” whereas the National R&D Regulation appears to subsume “technology transfer” as a subordinate concept within “assignment.” This creates confusion concerning the relationship between the concepts of “technology transfer” and “assignment,” as well as the related concept of “practice.”

C. Technology Royalties

Article 2(8) of the National R&D Regulation defines “technology royalties” as “an amount paid by a licensee to the institution owning an R&D result as consideration for acquiring the right to practice the R&D result.”

The question of what constitutes a technology royalty can ultimately be reduced to the question of what falls within the scope of “practice.” As discussed above, the concept of “practice” is inconsistently defined in the National R&D Regulation and its superior legislation, the Framework Act on Science and Technology. In addition, there are interpretive controversies arising from conflicts between the definitions of “practice” and “technology transfer” under the Framework Act on Science and Technology and the National R&D Regulation, on the one hand, and the Patent Act and the Technology Transfer Act, on the other.

Accordingly, there is inevitably a similar controversy concerning the scope of what should be regarded as a “technology royalty.”

The definition of technology royalties must be established before determining their distribution under the National R&D Regulation and other relevant regulations. Moreover, where technology royalties are regarded as a subordinate category of inventor compensation, their definition has practical significance in relation to the amount of inventor compensation and tax issues, including the scope of tax exemptions.

Therefore, there is an urgent need to establish a clear and uniform definition of “practice.”

D. Commercialization and Related Concepts

“Commercialization” or “technology commercialization” is generally defined as “the process of producing and selling products and services by transferring technology or applying it to a production process in order to realize the potential value of technology held by an entity.”

The Technology Transfer Act separately defines “commercialization” from the concept of “practice” prescribed under the Patent Act and the National R&D Regulation.

Under the National R&D Regulation, “practice” means producing products using R&D results and assigning, leasing, or exporting products. By contrast, “commercialization” under the Technology Transfer Act also includes developing products using technology and further includes improving technologies related to the process of developing, producing, or selling products.

Accordingly, the concept of “commercialization” under the Technology Transfer Act appears to encompass some, but not all, aspects of the concept of “practice” under the Patent Act, the Framework Act on Science and Technology, and the National R&D Regulation.

The National R&D Regulation also uses the term “commercialization.” Article 23(1)(2), concerning the use of technology royalties, provides that at least 10 percent of the portion of technology royalties attributable to government contributions must be used for expenses necessary to transfer or “commercialize” the technology developed. However, the regulation does not clarify precisely what “commercialization” means in this context or how it relates to “practice,” thereby creating further uncertainty.

Meanwhile, the Technology Transfer Act does not separately define “technology royalties.” Nevertheless, in defining the “technology trust management business,” the Act refers to a business that performs the collection, distribution, and management of technology royalties.

In addition, Article 19(2) of the Technology Transfer Act, concerning the promotion of the transfer and commercialization of public technology, provides:

“The head of a public research institution shall appropriately distribute a certain portion of the technology royalties generated from the transfer of technology developed by a researcher of the institution to the researcher and to such persons among the officers and employees of the public research institution who have contributed to the transfer of technology as prescribed by Presidential Decree.”

The provision uses the ambiguous expression “technology royalties generated from the transfer of technology.” It is unclear whether “transfer of technology” here refers only to the “technology transfer” defined in the Technology Transfer Act, whether it also includes commercialization, or whether it refers only to technology royalties generated from certain forms of commercialization.

If “transfer of technology” refers only to the “technology transfer” defined in the Technology Transfer Act, activities included within the definition of commercialization—such as developing and selling products and improving technologies related to those processes—would be excluded. Consequently, persons who contributed to those activities would arguably not be entitled to a share of the technology royalties.

However, under the Patent Act, the Framework Act on Science and Technology, and the National R&D Regulation, the concept of “practice” in national R&D projects includes activities such as using R&D results to produce products and assigning them. Under the Technology Transfer Act, however, cash or securities generated from such activities might not be regarded as technology royalties. This would result, without any apparent special justification, in a difference between the scope of technology royalties derived from the results of national R&D projects and the scope of technology royalties derived from basic projects and other activities of public institutions governed by the Technology Transfer Act.

Ultimately, differences in the statutory definitions concerning the scope of technology royalties may cause practical confusion in calculating technology royalties.

E. Conclusion

As discussed above, unclear definitions of key terms relating to technology transfer and commercialization and inconsistencies in the definitions of identical or similar terms across different laws and regulations may create confusion in the enforcement and interpretation of the law and consequently cause legal uncertainty.

Accordingly, legislative and regulatory reform is necessary, and the following proposals may be considered.

First, because the theoretical definition of “technology transfer” and the definition under the Technology Transfer Act more closely correspond to the ordinary linguistic meaning and generally accepted understanding of the term, the concept of “technology transfer” under the National R&D Regulation, which may be interpreted differently, should either be newly defined or expressly made subject to the definition contained in the Technology Transfer Act.

In other words, rather than subsuming “technology transfer” within the concept of “assignment,” “technology transfer” should be defined consistently with the Technology Transfer Act, while its relationship with the concept of “practice” should be clarified.

Second, the concept of “practice” with respect to the results of national R&D projects should be standardized according to the approach adopted in the Korean Patent Act, which is similar to the definitions found in the patent laws of Japan and China. In the case of designs, the relevant legislation would be the Design Protection Act, and in the case of utility models, the Utility Model Act.

Such an approach would be consistent with the increasing internationalization of intellectual property rights and would also enhance legal certainty by promoting consistency in the definitions of concepts across domestic laws and regulations.

Finally, rather than defining the relationship between “technology transfer” and “practice” as mutually exclusive or as one concept subsuming the other, the two concepts should be understood as complementary.

“Technology transfer” should focus on the “transfer” of intangible intellectual property, including inventions and other forms of technology, from one domain to another through various means. By contrast, “practice” should focus on the “utilization” of intellectual property—that is, acts involving the use, utilization, assignment, leasing, or importation of various forms of intellectual property encompassed by the concept of “technology,” or of products produced using such intellectual property.

Understanding and using the two concepts in this complementary manner would help resolve inconsistencies arising from attempts to establish a strict relationship of inclusion or exclusion between them.


3. Problems Concerning the Transfer of Intangible Results of National R&D Projects

A. The Problem of the De Facto Impossibility of Transfer

The United States has implemented legal systems since the 1980s to promote the utilization of R&D results. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act and the Bayh-Dole Act, both enacted in 1980, are representative examples. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act specifies technology transfer activities as a responsibility of the federal government. In particular, the Bayh-Dole Act governs the ownership and restrictions concerning rights to patents and technologies obtained through federal government support. Whereas such patents and technologies had previously been owned by the government, the Act permits universities, research institutions, and participating companies to own such patents and technologies under certain conditions. It also allows the government to require licensing of such technologies when they are not being adequately utilized, thereby seeking to promote the dissemination of R&D results from the public sector to the private sector.

Meanwhile, in 1984, the United States amended the Bayh-Dole Act to remove restrictions on exclusive licenses to large enterprises that had existed under the original Bayh-Dole Act. By extending the commercialization of research results generated with federal funding to large enterprises, this amendment has contributed to increased research activities among large corporations, universities, and nonprofit research institutions.

In accordance with this trend of defining the social dissemination of R&D results as a national responsibility and transferring ownership of research results supported by the government to the private sector subject to certain restrictions, Korea's Framework Act on Science and Technology and the Regulations on the Management, etc. of National Research and Development Projects (hereinafter, the “National R&D Regulations”), which contain policies concerning the implementation of national R&D projects, also provide that ownership of the results of national R&D projects may belong to research institutions or participating companies. Nevertheless, the National R&D Regulations impose restrictions on the transfer (or grant) of intangible R&D results to the private sector, thereby functioning as a regulatory barrier to the utilization of intangible R&D results generated in the public sector by private entities.

Article 20(2) of the former National R&D Regulations, prior to amendment, provided that intangible results obtained in the course of conducting a national R&D project (defined as including intellectual property rights and copyrights in research reports) belonged to the principal research institution, and that only in exceptional circumstances could they be solely owned by a participating institution or jointly owned by a participating institution and the principal research institution.

The amended National R&D Regulations changed this principle from ownership by the principal research institution to ownership by the R&D institution that created the intangible result. This eliminated the unreasonable outcome under the previous system whereby the principal research institution alone owned the research result regardless of whether the actual developer of the result was the principal research institution, a joint research institution, a commissioned research institution, or a participating company.

However, paragraph (5) of the same Article was not amended from the former National R&D Regulations. Paragraph (5) provides an exception to the principle in paragraph (2), stating, in particular, that where the institution owning the R&D results has completed the collection of royalties under Article 11-4(1) of the Framework Act on Science and Technology from a participating company or an implementing company, the institution may “grant” the intangible results to the participating company, implementing company, or another appropriate institution.

Here, an implementing company means a company that implements the R&D results, while Article 11-4(1) of the Framework Act on Science and Technology merely provides the general principle that royalties must be collected. Consequently, the Regulations permit a “grant” to another institution, including a participating company or implementing company, only where the collection of royalties from the participating company (where there is one) or the company implementing the R&D results has been completed in accordance with the terms of the relevant contract.

There are several problems here.

First, the term “grant” is not defined anywhere in the relevant statutes or regulations, which may cause confusion with the concept of “transfer.” Under the Patent Act, “transfer” is understood as the transfer of ownership of an invention produced to another person, either for consideration or without consideration, by an expression of intent. Similarly, there is room for debate as to whether “grant” should be understood as a transfer of ownership or as having the same meaning as “transfer” under the National R&D Regulations. If the latter interpretation is adopted, “grant” would have to be regarded as a concept encompassing “technology transfer” under the National R&D Regulations, resulting in a different scope of the term “grant” and creating interpretive confusion.

Second, assuming that the scope of “grant” includes at least the transfer of ownership of intellectual property rights or equivalent rights—including, in the case of an invention, the right to obtain a patent and rights associated with a pending patent application (hereinafter, “transfer of ownership or equivalent rights”)—Article 20(2) and (5) of the National R&D Regulations creates the problem that, with respect to intangible results among R&D results, a transfer of ownership or equivalent rights cannot be made without exception unless the collection of royalties from a participating company or implementing company has been completed.

Third, as mentioned above, the National R&D Regulations define “implementation” as “using the R&D results (including producing products using the R&D results), transferring them (including technology transfer), leasing them, or exporting them” pursuant to Article 11-4(1) of the Act. Accordingly, “transfer” as defined in the National R&D Regulations—which expressly includes “technology transfer”—is also included within the concept of “implementation.”

Furthermore, under the Act on the Promotion of Technology Transfer and Commercialization, “technology transfer” is defined as the transfer of technology from a technology holder (including a person authorized to dispose of the technology) to another person by means such as transfer, granting of a license, technical guidance, joint research, joint investment, or merger and acquisition. Therefore, where technology is transferred from a technology holder to another person through the method of “transfer” in the meaning of that Act, such transfer constitutes “technology transfer,” and the transfer of technology through such a method constitutes “implementation.”

If the concept of “grant” is identical to, encompasses, or partially overlaps with the ordinary meaning of “transfer”—that is, provided that the concepts are not mutually exclusive—the transfer of technology through a “grant” would constitute “implementation.” Given that the concept of “implementation” is defined in this manner, it would be reasonable to interpret the definition as already encompassing the possibility of granting intangible results and thereby enabling their implementation by companies.

Nevertheless, Article 20(2) and (5) of the National R&D Regulations provides that “grant” is, in principle, not permitted, thereby creating a contradiction. In light of the fact that paragraphs (2) and (5) separately provide that ownership belongs to the institution that developed the results and that the results may be “granted” in certain circumstances, it may be interpreted that the provision was intended to exclude “grant” from the concept of implementation.

However, despite defining “implementation” to include the “transfer” of research results, providing that “grant” is not permitted creates room for dispute over whether a “transfer of ownership or equivalent rights” is permissible, quite apart from the confusion between the concepts of “transfer” and “grant.”

Although there is room for interpretive dispute as to whether ownership of intangible results may be transferred, the fact that there is a separate provision stating that “grant” is prohibited except in specified circumstances suggests that, except where royalties have been fully collected from a participating company or implementing company, as specified in the relevant provision, a “transfer of ownership or equivalent rights” of intangible results should be regarded as impermissible.

However, this creates an unreasonable situation. In practice, intangible results generated through national R&D projects cannot be implemented through a transfer of ownership or equivalent rights. Moreover, researchers may move between institutions and create results that are on a continuum with existing research results. Transferring such results to a single institution and packaging them together for “technology transfer” could increase the possibility of technology transfer and enhance the value of the R&D results. Nevertheless, the transfer of ownership or equivalent rights in research results between institutions is effectively impossible.

This is particularly problematic for government-funded research institutes. Because such institutes are nonprofit legal entities, it is difficult for them to commercialize technologies directly, and they therefore cannot readily pay royalties to the institution owning the R&D results. As a result, it is difficult for them to satisfy the requirement that royalty collection be completed. Accordingly, government-funded research institutes may, in principle, be structurally unable to transfer ownership or equivalent rights in intangible results to one another.

Although these institutions are public institutions established and funded by the government and entrusted with the mission of conducting national R&D projects, they are unable to transfer ownership or equivalent rights in intangible results such as intellectual property rights to one another merely because they have separate legal personalities. Thus, the relevant provision may end up functioning as a de facto restriction on technology transfer rather than promoting it.

Meanwhile, because the “basic projects” of government-funded research institutes are not subject to the National R&D Regulations, research results generated through such basic projects may be transferred in terms of ownership or equivalent rights between institutions. It is therefore difficult to regard it as reasonable to regulate the transfer of ownership between institutions differently, without a special justification, merely because the results were generated through a national R&D project.

Article 21(5) of the National R&D Regulations does contain an exception allowing the head of the institution owning the R&D results or the head of the relevant specialized agency to transfer the intellectual property rights to an appropriate institution. Although this provision specifies exceptions to the de facto prohibition on transfers, it applies only to “registered intellectual property rights.” Consequently, unregistered intellectual property rights and know-how remain subject to the problem that they cannot be transferred.

Moreover, the provision establishes the ambiguous criterion that transfer to an appropriate institution is permitted only where there are “grounds for determining that a technology implementation agreement will not be concluded.” Cases in which it is clearly established that a technology implementation agreement will not be concluded are likely to be extremely rare, and proving such circumstances would also be difficult. Accordingly, it is likely that there will be very few circumstances in which the principal research institution or specialized agency can actually make a transfer, and the provision may therefore remain effectively a dead letter.

Meanwhile, the amended National R&D Regulations newly introduced paragraphs (8) and (9) of Article 21. Where implementation of an intangible result owned by another research institution arising from the same R&D project is necessary in order to implement an institution's own intangible result under Article 20(2), the head of the owning institution must permit such implementation in accordance with the relevant agreement. The institution seeking implementation must request permission in writing from the head of the institution owning the relevant intangible result within the period prescribed by the head of the central administrative agency.

Accordingly, even where multiple intangible results necessary for a particular implementation are owned by different institutions, implementation is now possible where: (1) implementation of an intangible result owned by another research institution arising from the same R&D project is necessary to implement one's own intangible result; (2) the relevant arrangement is provided for in the agreement; and (3) a written request is made to the head of the owning institution within the period prescribed by the head of the central administrative agency. The parties may then negotiate and determine the period and conditions of implementation.

Thus, under the newly introduced provisions, even without transferring intangible results between institutions, implementation may be possible in certain specific circumstances if the prescribed requirements are satisfied. However, these circumstances are highly exceptional. This is because it is quite rare for an intangible result owned by another research institution arising from the same R&D project to be necessary for implementation of one's own intangible result; there is the additional difficulty of making a written request; the arrangement must be reflected in the agreement; and the right must be exercised within a specified period.

Accordingly, it is difficult to regard these provisions as resolving the unreasonable consequences arising from the inability to transfer intangible results between institutions, which is the issue discussed in this paper.

Of course, if intangible results from national R&D projects could freely be transferred in terms of ownership or equivalent rights to other institutions or companies, there could be concern that intangible assets possessing characteristics of public goods might be granted exclusively to particular individuals or legal entities.

However, there is also a strong view that broadly disseminating intangible assets from the public sector into the private sector is a means of promoting technology transfer and commercialization. If transfers are permitted subject to complementary safeguards—such as requiring substantial consideration for the transfer and appropriately identifying institutions capable of efficiently commercializing the technology—this would arguably come closer to the objective of promoting technology transfer and commercialization and, ultimately, creating technology-based added value.

B. The Problem of the De Facto Obsolescence of the Provision on Gratuitous Transfer to Inventors

The proviso to Article 20(5) of the National R&D Regulations provides that, where the institution owning the R&D results relinquishes its rights to the R&D results, it may gratuitously grant those results to the principal investigator who conducted the R&D project.

The purpose of this system appears to be to provide the inventor with an opportunity to utilize the R&D results where the institution relinquishes its rights, thereby preventing the value (market value) of the research results from disappearing and causing a social loss. Since the inventor, particularly the principal investigator, has the greatest understanding of the research results and is the original rights holder of the invention, the provision appears intended to give such inventor an opportunity to utilize the results and thereby increase their utilization.

It is necessary, however, to clarify what is meant by “relinquishment of rights” to R&D results, at least with respect to intangible results.

First, it is unclear whether “relinquishment of rights” includes relinquishment of only some of the rights comprising ownership of an intangible result, such as patent rights in the case of a patent.

This issue is related to the meaning of “grant.” If “grant” means the transfer of ownership itself—or, in the case of a patent, the patent right itself—then relinquishment of rights would mean relinquishment of ownership or the patent right. This follows from the premise that ownership can be transferred only if it can first be relinquished.

Conversely, if “grant” could mean the transfer of individual rights included within a patent right, such as a non-exclusive license or exclusive license, then it would also be possible to relinquish only individual rights such as licensing rights.

However, considering that the ordinary meaning of “grant” may be understood as a “transfer of ownership or equivalent rights,” together with the provision that a grant is permitted only after collection of royalties has been completed, it is more reasonable to understand relinquishment as the transfer of ownership of the intangible result itself—or, in the case of a patent, the patent right itself—rather than as the separate relinquishment of individual rights ancillary to the intangible result.

Second, it may be disputed whether relinquishment of only a fractional share of the rights in an intangible result is possible. However, the purpose of the provision appears to be to provide the inventor with an opportunity to utilize the relinquished research result, thereby enhancing the inventor's rights and increasing utilization of the research result. There would be little reason for the original owner to retain a fractional share and exercise certain rights over the result. Accordingly, “relinquishment” here should be understood as complete relinquishment of the rights.

Similarly, under the employee invention system under the Invention Promotion Act, where an employer relinquishes its right to succeed to an employee invention despite satisfying the requirements for a prearranged succession agreement, the invention is treated as a free invention and the rights remain with the inventor. This is reasonably understood as being intended to strengthen protection of the inventor by allowing the inventor to exercise exclusive rights over an invention that originally belongs to the inventor. It would therefore be difficult to interpret such a free invention as being recognized only with respect to a particular fractional share.

By analogy to the interpretation that relinquishment of an employer's rights to an employee invention under the employee invention system means complete relinquishment of the rights, it would be difficult to regard it as a reasonable interpretation to construe “relinquishment of rights” under the National R&D Regulations as including only partial relinquishment.

Third, the provision states that the results “may” be granted gratuitously to the principal investigator, meaning that gratuitous transfer upon relinquishment of rights is left to the discretion of the institution owning the R&D results, without providing any other mechanism to encourage such transfer.

Accordingly, even where unavoidable circumstances arise requiring the institution to relinquish rights to an intangible result—for example, because the institution lacks the funds necessary to maintain the rights—if gratuitous transfer would enable the inventor (principal investigator) to generate personal income, the decision-makers of the institution could potentially face criticism or liability for having made the transfer. As a result, it may be more likely that institutions will simply relinquish the rights without making the transfer.

Ultimately, the proviso concerning gratuitous transfer is structured in a manner that makes it difficult to realize the legislative purpose, and unless another mechanism is established to compel or encourage such transfers, the provision is likely to remain effectively obsolete.

Accordingly, complementary measures such as immunity from liability or incentive systems for gratuitous transfers would be necessary. Such measures could ensure that, even where rights to research results must unavoidably be relinquished, those rights are not wasted but instead provide the inventor (principal investigator) with an opportunity to utilize them and create added value, consistent with the purpose of the provision.


4. Examination of a Priority System for Domestic Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Technology Implementation

Article 21(1) of the National R&D Regulations provides that “when intending to enter into a technology implementation agreement with a party other than a participating company, domestic small and medium-sized enterprises capable of implementing the technology shall be considered as a priority.”

Although this provision is intended to foster and promote domestic SMEs, because it requires SMEs to be given priority without exception, it may create unreasonable situations in which intangible results that could have been transferred if domestic large enterprises or foreign companies had been targeted instead become unused because an appropriate demand-side party cannot be found among domestic SMEs.

Ultimately, even where a research result is difficult for domestic SMEs to implement and domestic SMEs have no actual interest in it, the institution may be required first to conduct formal marketing efforts toward SMEs and only afterward conclude an implementation agreement with a large enterprise or foreign company. This can result in unnecessary transaction costs or, in some cases, the loss of an opportunity to conclude an implementation agreement.

Meanwhile, intellectual property markets have already become globalized for several reasons. Major countries around the world have joined the Paris Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty, making it easier to file and register intellectual property rights worldwide. The development of the Internet has facilitated the distribution of intellectual property, and the increasing frequency of international disputes concerning intellectual property has heightened awareness of its importance.

In addition, major economies such as the United States, the European Union, and China have entered into numerous free trade agreements with one another in competition, resulting in the gradual removal of trade barriers and a sharp increase in exports and imports. In this increasingly open trading environment, companies around the world are actively seeking to export or license intangible property to customers throughout the world.

Multilateral trade agreements such as the FTAs and GATT have also strengthened the protection of intangible property and have generally sought to remove barriers to transactions involving intangible property.

Thus, although the market for intangible results has already expanded beyond Korea to the entire world as a result of the globalization of intellectual property markets, the domestic SME priority system requires institutions to make efforts to transfer technology to SMEs before attempting to enter into implementation agreements with other companies, even where it is clear that particular R&D results are difficult to transfer to SMEs, without considering the type, field, or value of the technology.

This may function as a regulation on technology transfer and commercialization that narrows the range of potential recipients of results generated by national R&D projects.

It could, of course, be argued that the system promotes and supports domestic SMEs and prevents harm to domestic companies resulting from the leakage of research results to hostile non-practicing entities (NPEs). However, given that the systems and markets relating to intellectual property rights have already become internationalized, it is difficult to conclude that these effects necessarily outweigh the value that could be generated by entering into technology implementation agreements on a worldwide basis.

Moreover, the objective of fostering and supporting SMEs could be achieved selectively without requiring technology marketing to domestic SMEs in every case.

Ultimately, given the characteristics of intellectual property rights, it would be desirable for the dissemination of research results to target the global market without distinguishing between domestic and foreign markets.

There may also be situations in which a technology implementation agreement with a foreign company must be concluded first because of patent infringement by a foreign company. The current National R&D Regulations do not appear to take such exceptional circumstances into account. In light of arguments that an exception should be introduced to relax the domestic-priority requirement in such exceptional circumstances, it would be necessary to revise the current legal framework.


5. Examination of the Possibility of a GATT Violation within the WTO System

Some of Korea's laws and policies concerning technology transfer and commercialization under national R&D projects are intended to support domestic companies. It would therefore be meaningful to examine whether such laws and policies are consistent with the WTO system, the multilateral trading system established in 1995 with the objective of eliminating trade barriers.

Since the establishment of the WTO system, Korea's R&D policies have already been examined for their conformity with the GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter, the “SCM Agreement”).

Korea's national R&D support programs may broadly be divided into: (i) technology development; (ii) infrastructure development; (iii) regional innovation; and (iv) technology transfer and consulting programs. R&D programs satisfying the following requirements have been identified as potentially violating GATT: ① the measure is taken by the government or a public body; ② there is a financial contribution; ③ a benefit is thereby conferred on the recipient of the support measure; and ④ the provision of the support is limited in law or in fact to certain enterprises or industries, or to certain enterprises located within a particular region, thereby satisfying the requirement of specificity. Policy measures have also been proposed to correct such programs or prevent violations of the agreement.

This paper examines whether government benefits provided in connection with the collection of royalties, which is pursued alongside policies promoting the transfer and dissemination of technology, could violate the SCM Agreement under GATT.

Article 11-4(2) of the Framework Act on Science and Technology provides that, upon an application by a person intending to implement R&D results, the head of the central administrative agency may, with approval, reduce the royalty or extend the collection period.

Article 22(5) of the National R&D Regulations provides that the head of the central administrative agency shall determine detailed criteria concerning reductions in royalties and extensions of the collection period under the Framework Act on Science and Technology.

Article 38(7) of the Regulations on the Management, etc. of R&D Projects in the Field of Science and Technology under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (hereinafter, the “Ministry R&D Regulations”), an administrative directive issued by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, provides circumstances in which the Minister may approve a royalty reduction regardless of whether the person intending to implement the R&D results has applied for such reduction.

The provision of the administrative directive, or a government measure taken pursuant to that provision, clearly satisfies the first requirement because it constitutes a government measure. The reduction in anticipated government revenue resulting from the measure may be regarded as a financial contribution, satisfying the second requirement. Furthermore, because the obligation to pay royalties is reduced as a result of the measure, the recipient receives a benefit equivalent to the amount of the reduction, satisfying the third requirement.

Thus, three of the four requirements for a subsidy under the SCM Agreement appear to be satisfied.

Accordingly, the key issue in determining whether the measure violates the agreement is whether the measure satisfies the requirement of specificity—namely, whether the provision of the measure is limited in law or in fact to certain enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of a member state, or to certain enterprises located within a particular region.

Among the grounds listed in Article 38(7) of the Ministry R&D Regulations, the requirement in subparagraph 1 concerning “the fact that only part has been commercialized” and the requirement in subparagraph 2 that “support is necessary because of public interest, an import/export strategy, or leading-edge technology” would not readily be regarded as being limited to a particular industry, enterprise, or region.

However, the requirement in subparagraph 3 concerning cases “where demand is limited to and the technology is used by a specific field such as public institutions,” and the requirement in subparagraph 4 concerning cases “where a contributor to the Nuclear Research and Development Fund implements jointly owned intellectual property rights, etc.” may be more likely to be limited to a particular industry, group of enterprises, or enterprises located in a particular region.

Considering that participants in national R&D projects are, in practice, domestic institutions, there is substantial room to regard such measures as satisfying the de facto specificity requirement by being limited to certain enterprises or industries within Korea's jurisdiction or to certain enterprises located in particular regions.

Even if the administrative directive itself were considered insufficient to satisfy the specificity requirement, where the head of a central administrative agency takes a royalty-reduction measure satisfying the specificity requirement pursuant to departmental directives such as the Ministry R&D Regulations or pursuant to the National R&D Regulations, such measure could constitute a measure inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. Accordingly, considerable caution is required in administering the royalty-reduction system.

When implementing laws and policies to promote technology transfer and commercialization, particularly where systems and policies are designed to support or protect domestic companies, care must be taken, as discussed above, to ensure that such measures do not constitute subsidies under the SCM Agreement.

In particular, because benefits relating to royalties are clearly monetary benefits, special care should be taken to ensure that they do not satisfy the specificity requirement. Systems or policies that could be interpreted as providing benefits to particular enterprises or groups of enterprises, industries or groups of industries, or regions should therefore be avoided, and the relevant systems and policies should be administered so that benefits in practice do not accrue specifically to enterprises in a particular group, industry, or region.


6. The Scope of Deductions in the Allocation of Royalties

Article 23(1) of the amended National R&D Regulations provides that, where the institution owning the R&D results is a nonprofit legal entity, 5 percent of the portion of royalties corresponding to the government's contribution shall first be used or reserved for expenses relating to the filing, registration, and maintenance of intellectual property rights (hereinafter, “management expenses”), and the remaining royalties shall be used in accordance with the following subparagraphs.

Compared with the former National R&D Regulations, the amended Regulations seek to ensure the smooth procurement of intellectual property management expenses by requiring 5 percent of the portion of royalties corresponding to the government's contribution to be used or reserved first for such expenses.

Meanwhile, as under the former National R&D Regulations, at least 50 percent of the government's contribution share of the royalties must be used as compensation for researchers participating in the R&D project, at least 10 percent must be used for expenses necessary to transfer or commercialize the technology developed, and the remaining amount may be used for reinvestment in R&D, institutional operating expenses, expenses relating to the filing, registration, and maintenance of intellectual property, and compensation for employees and others who contributed to the dissemination of technology.

However, Article 39(1) of the Ministry R&D Regulations, an administrative directive issued by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, provides that at least 50 percent of the amount remaining after deducting expenses incurred for transferring or commercializing the developed technology and expenses relating to the filing, registration, and maintenance of intellectual property rights shall be paid as compensation to researchers participating in the R&D project, with the remaining amount being used for reinvestment in R&D and other purposes.

As a result, although the higher-level regulation—the National R&D Regulations, which is a Presidential Decree—requires at least 50 percent of the government's contribution share of the total royalties to be paid as compensation to participating researchers, the lower-level administrative directive permits a smaller amount to be paid by requiring 50 percent only of the amount remaining after expenses are deducted.

This restricts the rights of participating researchers and of “employees and others who contributed to technology dissemination” under the National R&D Regulations beyond the scope of the delegation granted by the higher-level regulation. Accordingly, it is reasonable to regard the relevant provision as invalid to the extent that it exceeds the scope of the delegated authority.


III. Conclusion

As examined above, various policies have been established through various laws and regulations to promote the technology transfer, commercialization, and implementation of research results generated through national R&D projects. However, the definitions of concepts relating to technology transfer and commercialization are not sufficiently precise, there are conflicts among the relevant laws and regulations, and there also appear to be problems arising from lower-level regulations exceeding the scope of delegation provided by higher-level legislation.

Furthermore, while certain policies regulate technology transfer and commercialization, there are also cases in which policies intended to promote technology transfer and commercialization themselves operate as obstacles to such activities.

These problems may arise from inadequate coordination among the relevant legal systems or from problems in the legislative drafting of particular policies, contrary to the original purposes of the legislation.

When establishing and implementing systems or policies to promote technology transfer and commercialization, it is also necessary to consider the characteristics of intangible results such as intellectual property rights and to approach the issue from an international perspective, given that transactions involving such results are conducted in international markets in accordance with international rules.

In addition, where technology transfer and commercialization are promoted for the purpose of supporting domestic SMEs or domestic industries, it is necessary to consider whether the relevant measures are consistent with applicable agreements, particularly in light of the trend toward the removal of trade barriers resulting from the conclusion of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements.

It is encouraging that recent amendments to the National R&D Regulations have incorporated more reasonable policies for promoting technology transfer and commercialization, including a more rational allocation of ownership of R&D results and differentiated compensation for research participants in the allocation of royalties.

Going forward, it will be necessary not only to establish a coherent legal framework when implementing policies and systems to promote technology transfer and commercialization under national R&D projects, but also to remove unnecessary or unintended regulatory barriers so as to establish a legal system through which the results of national R&D projects can be widely disseminated throughout society.


Abstract

Korea has implemented various laws and systems to ensure that results obtained from national R&D projects are transferred or commercialized and thereby disseminated throughout society. Laws such as the Patent Act, the Framework Act on Science and Technology, the Act on the Promotion of Technology Transfer and Commercialization, and the Regulations on the Management, etc. of National Research and Development Projects (hereinafter, the “National R&D Regulations”) establish basic principles concerning policies for the dissemination of intangible results.

However, these laws do not provide sufficiently precise definitions of key terms concerning intangible results, such as “implementation,” “technology transfer,” “commercialization,” “royalty,” “transfer,” and “grant.” In addition, the same terms are sometimes used inconsistently within individual laws or across different laws, creating room for dispute concerning their interpretation and application.

Meanwhile, since the enactment in 1980 of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, which established a system under which ownership of technologies and patents arising from federal government support could be vested in research institutions and participating companies rather than the government, Korea has also sought, through the Framework Act on Science and Technology and the National R&D Regulations, to allow ownership of intangible results from national R&D projects to be vested in R&D institutions and other entities, thereby facilitating the broad dissemination of R&D results into the private sector.

Nevertheless, the National R&D Regulations restrict the ability of institutions owning intangible results to transfer or grant those results to other institutions, thereby functioning, to some extent, as a regulatory barrier to the social dissemination of research results.

The Regulations also permit an institution owning intangible results to transfer or grant those results to the inventor (principal investigator) when the institution relinquishes its rights to the results. However, because the requirements of this provision lack practical feasibility, the provision may become effectively obsolete.

The priority system for domestic SMEs in technology implementation agreements established under the National R&D Regulations may also operate as a restriction on the social dissemination of intangible results by limiting technology implementation in overseas markets in an era of globalization of intellectual property markets.

Meanwhile, the National R&D Regulations and certain administrative directives issued by central government agencies establish a royalty-reduction system that effectively functions as a support policy for domestic institutions. Because such royalty-reduction measures and government actions based on them may potentially violate the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures adopted under the GATT/WTO system, care must be taken when establishing and implementing royalty-reduction systems and policies to ensure that they do not violate the relevant agreement.

In implementing policies and systems to promote technology transfer and commercialization under national R&D projects, it is necessary to establish a coherent legal framework while removing unnecessary or unintended regulatory barriers, thereby creating a legal system through which the results of national R&D projects can be broadly disseminated throughout society.

Keywords: National R&D projects; Regulations on the Management, etc. of National Research and Development Projects; technology transfer; commercialization; implementation; royalties; transfer; small and medium-sized enterprises; GATT; SCM